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This paper aims to address the autonomy of international organizations in law and in normative debate 
generally, but will do so in unorthodox manner. In order to make the point that the autonomy of international 
organizations (from their member states) is strengthened by the way normative discussions tend to be 
structured, I will first need to provide an outline of the basic structure of normative debate – an outline that 
owes much, as cognoscenti will recognize, to the work of Alasdair MacIntyre.2 The general point then to 
emerge (but without being further investigated) is that the autonomy of international organizations is not so 
much directly a factor of the will of the organization or of its member states, but follows nigh-on inevitably 
from the structures of normative debate: such debates presuppose autonomy, and strengthen autonomy. In 
other words, achieving autonomy is not dependent on political intentions – not only, at any rate. Instead, I will 
argue that autonomy is achieved whenever international organizations are engaged in legal or ethical debate. 
This presupposes that I start with a brief and rough outline of how normative debate is structured. 
Much ethical argument pits the two leading Western ethical approaches against each other, and much legal 
argument follows the same pattern. Much normative argument consists of an oscillation between 
deontological and consequentialist approaches.3 This is probably no surprise: deontology and consequentialism 
are both children of the Enlightenment, ethical theories isolated from any social or historical anchoring but 
based on conflicting yet complementary assumptions about human behavior. The result is that moral 
disagreement and ethical debate remain interminable, not merely because they go on and on but, more 
fundamentally, as MacIntyre once suggested, because ‘they apparently can find no terminus.’4  
Perhaps the best example, highly topical in 2017/2018, is the #metoo discussion, sparked by accusations of 
sexual harassment against film producer Harvey Weinstein and followed by many similar accusations in the film 
industry, academia, and elsewhere. The most serious response to date consists of an open letter to the French 
newspaper Le Monde, signed by a hundred or so women active in the same fields of occupation. So how is this 
debate structured? 
Weinstein’s prosecutors and others suggest, mostly, that all sorts of rules, written and unwritten, have been 
broken. They suggest that acts of harassment have been many, and are typically linked to a power imbalance: 
many of the accused are powerful men, while many of the victims are relatively powerless: young women 
aspiring to become actors, or academics, and sometimes young boys with similar aspirations. Sexual 
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harassment is illegal, so the claim goes, and in violation of all sorts of standards, the sorts of standards that all 
of us know, and which are linked to blackmail (‘Have sex with me otherwise you won’t get that promising film 
role’), power abuse, and similar issues. In doing so, the tone of the accusation is mostly deontological: the acts 
of the accused are bad because they go against our rules. 
By contrast, the tone of the letter to Le Monde is different: it focuses not so much on whether or not any rules 
have been broken, but on the consequences of making allegations and accusation that rules have been broken. 
Even if the allegations are true, so the letter suggests, the consequences are dire: the #metoo movement is 
creating a new climate of sexual puritanism, in which some men have already been victimized by having been 
falsely accused of harassment.5 In emphasizing the consequences of the #metoo campaign, the letter writers (a 
large group of women, said to include author Catherine Millet and film star Catherine Deneuve) adopt a 
consequentialist approach. 
The problem that transpires then is that both groups talk past each other: their approaches are 
incommensurate. The #metoo campaign taps into a deontological logic, and for whatever such a logic is worth, 
it is often vulnerable to consequentialist critiques precisely because deontological arguments typically do not 
focus on consequences: what matters is that rules have been broken – this is considered bad enough in its own 
right, regardless of the consequences. By contrast, the Le Monde letter writers tap into a consequentialist logic, 
emphasizing how undesirable the consequences are, both for individuals who have stood falsely accused, and 
for society at large (by invoking what they call ‘the new puritanism’): the world will be a worse place. It is no 
surprise though that such an approach is often susceptible to a deontological critique, precisely because to the 
consequentialist it is not all that relevant whether rules have been broken – and it is no coincidence that 
responses to the Le Monde letter keep insisting on rules having been broken, meeting a consequentialist 
argument with a deontological critique.   
Whether consciously or subconsciously, the parties to the debate both realize that their own premises render 
them vulnerable to comments from the opposite camp, so they do their best to cater to the other approach. 
The Le Monde letter, while consequentialist in tone, nonetheless acknowledges that rules exist and have been 
broken: opening up the discussion and bringing instances of harassment to the fore was considered necessary 
but, so they insist, the movement is now going too far or turning against itself. And while some men have 
clearly broken those rules, one should acknowledge that the rules are open to differing interpretations: there is 
a difference between flirting or clumsy pick up attempts on the one hand, and harassment on the other. 
For its part, the #metoo movement too is not blind to consequences: it not only insists on rules being broken, 
but additionally it promises a world free of harassment as a consequence of the campaign, as well as justice for 
those who have been victimized. Thus, while it starts from deontological premises, it pays homage to 
consequentialism by pointing to the possible results of a though campaign: the world will be a better place. In 
short, the #metoo debate oscillates between deontology and consequentialism. Rules are acknowledged to 
exist by both parties, but differently interpreted; consequences are envisaged by both parties, but differently 
emphasized. As a result, the debate seems interminable and unsolvable, and it may be hypothesized that a 
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reasonable conclusion will be difficult to find as long as the protagonists remain enclosed in a circle of 
deontology and consequentialism.6 
What applies to ethical debate generally also applies to debate concerning international organizations, 
whether ethical or legal in nature (and the two are often difficult to distinguish to begin with). International 
organizations are analytically involved in three types of legal relations.7 First, there is the relationship between 
the organization and its member states, to which the dominant approach is a functionalist approach. Second, 
there is the internal dimension: the organization relates in one way or another to its staff members, and its 
organs stand in some kind of relationship to each other. And third, there are the relations with the outside 
world: with third states or organizations, with civil society, with individuals. I will discuss examples of ethical-
legal debate from all three settings, and will aim to discuss whether and if so that what extent the autonomy of 
international organizations is a function of the way these debates take place. I use ‘autonomy’ in a fairly broad 
sense, which seems fully justified by the consideration that this paper is a first attempt to think about 
autonomy as a function of the debates in which organizations are engaged, rather than as a variable influenced 
by power political considerations or material interests.8 With a little more precision, I will presume that the 
autonomy of international organizations is connected to what may be called ‘moral autonomy’, a broader 
concept applicable to states, organizations and individuals alike, and fundamental to much legal and ethical 
debate. Another way of referring to moral autonomy is to speak of ‘freedom’: the freedom to act without 
constraints, except constraints that are self-imposed, precisely by virtue of the moral autonomy of the actors. 
In less abstract terms, I will assume that our everyday conception of the relevant actors is that they are free to 
act as they please, unless they have consented to something else. It seems to me that this assumption is fairly 
uncontroversial, but I will not engage in an attempt to defend it. 
Some further preliminary comments are in order. In what follows, I will use legal debate as a proxy for ethical 
debate. I realize law and ethics are not identical (this will become clear especially towards the end of the 
paper), but they are not unrelated either, and at any rate, for present purposes the distinction is not 
particularly relevant.9 By the same token, I will not distinguish between ethics and morality, partly because 
there are many ways of making this distinction10, and partly because, again, for present purposes nothing 
hinges on the distinction. 
Neither will I focus on whether autonomy can be said to be a principle of international organizations law. For 
one thing, a strong argument can be made that there is no such thing as a separate corpus of rules and 
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principles to be referred to as international organizations law. Typically, organizations have their own legal 
order, and to the extent that they interact with others, they are subjected to general international law (or, on 
occasion, domestic law).11 It is no coincidence that no one speaks of the ‘rule’ or ‘principle’ of implied powers, 
but that talk is of the doctrine of ‘implied powers’: a solution valid in organization X is not by definition and 
extension valid for organizations Y and Z. Heuristically, for purposes of teaching and discussion, all these 
doctrines and existing rules relating to specific organizations may be viewed as international organizations law; 
for legal purposes, however, conclusions drawn with respect to one organization cannot without more be 
transplanted to other settings.12 Hence, there is little to be gained by concentrating on whether there exists a 
principle of autonomy in international organizations. Instead, the focus will rests on how institutional 
autonomy is stimulated by legal debate, and can be regarded as the inevitable consequence thereof.  
The paper will be structured as follows. I will discuss three incidents relating to the three different kinds of legal 
relations that international organizations can entertain: with their member states (the proposed expulsion of 
Liberia from the League of Nations), their staff (McCarthyism in UNESCO), and the external world (the infamous 
Haiti cholera affair in which the UN has been embroiled). The three vignettes not only involve different legal 
relations and legal issues, they also involve different international organizations, and involve different time 
frames; together they provide a picture of patterns repeating themselves regardless of time and place. This will 
be followed by a discussion of how the practice of legal and ethical argument affects the autonomy of 
international organizations.  
 
II. The Organization and its Members: Liberia’s Proposed Expulsion from the League of Nations13 
 
Liberia was among the original members of the League of Nations, having declared itself to be on the side of 
the Allied Powers during World War I. As such, it was automatically entitled to join the League, regardless of 
whether it met the League’s requirements for membership – Liechtenstein found out, to its dismay, that 
membership of the League was not always and automatically granted to applicant states.14 
Liberia’s fitness for membership would come to be questioned though from the late 1920s onwards, when it 
became abundantly clear that slavery and compulsory labour were widely practiced in Liberia (‘a system hardly 
distinguishable from slavery’, as Eden put it15), and in particular after reports came in about mistreatment of 
members of the Kru tribe (actually a group of related tribes) by government forces. Several reports 
commissioned by the League confirmed as much, and by 1934 the United Kingdom raised the possibility of 
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Liberia’s expulsion.  Things never got quite that far: the most far-reaching motion tabled in the League Council 
was devoted to withdrawing an assistance plan. Nonetheless, the argumentation was revealing.16 
Already prior to the Liberia episode, the League had discussed the legal regime relating to expulsion, in light of 
the indeterminate nature of the pertinent provision, i.e. the fourth paragraph of Article 16 of the Covenant. 
This held that ‘Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to 
be no longer a Member of the League’ after a unanimous vote of all other members represented on the 
Council. Much of that discussion revolved around the ‘de minimis’ question. As the provision spoke of 
‘violation’ pure and simple, without qualification, an argument could be made (and was made by 
commentators) that literally any violation, no matter how irrelevant, could be ground for expulsion. The 
Council itself argued differently though, suggesting the relevance of a principle of proportionality: surely, in 
some cases, expulsion would serve no purpose of the League and merely be counter-productive.17 
The possibility of expulsion was raised in the aftermath of discussions about assistance through the UK 
representative, Anthony Eden.18 His argument was clear, and tapped into deontological reasoning. To Eden’s 
mind, in particular the mistreatment of the Kru tribes amounted to a violation of the rule contained in article 
23 of the Covenant, in particular the obligation ‘to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants’ of territories 
under member state control contained in paragraph (b) of Article 23. This in itself would be sufficient to trigger 
the expulsion clause of Article 16. Liberia countered19 by suggesting that the evidence on which the UK based 
itself might be less than compelling and could have been tainted by political considerations, therewith 
effectively denying that any violation had taken place. 
Both also, however, hinted at consequentialist arguments. For the UK, it was clear that expulsion would not in 
itself ‘assist towards a solution of the Liberia problem’, but this was simply a case of such magnitude that it 
could not be passed over in silence: Eden spoke of ‘gross maladministration’, a ‘real tragedy’, and the 
suggestion, carefully phrased, was that the League should not offer a veneer of respectability to a state with 
am ‘unrelieved record of misery and misgovernment’.20 And while Eden did not mention it before the League, 
reportedly debates in the British House of Lords suggested that the UK was rather worried about the possible 
spread of epidemic diseases, mismanaged by Liberia’s authorities, to neighbouring British territories.21 Liberia, 
for its part, suggested in a consequentialist vein that much of the fighting had been ‘inter-tribal’, and if there 
had been government action it had been fully justified due to the threat of Kru colonies from neighbouring 
countries, who were either making efforts to join the fighting or tried to smuggle in arms and ammunition to 
supply Liberia’s tribes in their fight against the government.22 
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Again then, both sides utilized deontological as well as consequentialist argument. The deontological argument 
revolved around whether article 23(b) of the Covenant had been violated, with the UK arguing that it had and 
Liberia instead claiming that the allegations were ‘a pure invention’, and part of a ‘propaganda campaign’.23 As 
for the consequentialist part, the UK suggested there should be no place in the League for a state such as 
Liberia; the League was not supposed to harbour criminal governments, and allowing Liberia to stay inside 
would set an unhappy precedent24; Liberia, in turn, downplayed the allegations, and justified them by pointing 
to external circumstances: they were necessary to prevent further escalation due to the involvement of foreign 
sympathizers. 
 
III. The Organization and its Staff: McCarthyism in UNESCO 
 
The post-war surge in the number of international organizations was quickly followed by the outbreak of the 
Cold War, and it should come as no surprise that international organizations too became the site of Cold War 
struggles. One particularly well-known manifestation was the crusade launched by Senator Joseph McCarthy, 
so well-known that ‘McCarthyism’ has become a by-word for witch hunts. McCarthy questioned the loyalty of 
American citizens suspected of communist citizens, and while some of targets were film starts, directors and 
other inhabitants of Hollywood, his work also affected international organizations.25 International civil servants 
with American citizenship were often asked to make public or discuss their convictions or sympathies, and the 
US government set up an International Organisations Employees Loyalty Board, which sent questionnaires and 
invited international civil servants of US provenance to state their loyalties.  
Many must have complied, but some did not. Within the UN itself the bouts of McCarthyism took a quite 
dramatic turn in the autumn of 1952, which would eventually lead to the creation of the above-mentioned 
Loyalty Board.26 A number of individuals were summoned to appear before the Internal Security Subcommittee 
of the US Senate Judiciary Committee, and eighteen of them pleaded the Fifth Amendment, containing the 
right against self-incrimination. Secretary-General Trygve Lie responded by dismissing the individuals who had 
a temporary contract with the UN; those with a permanent contract were placed on compulsory leave, and an 
international commission of jurists was established to see what further action could be taken.  
In the process, judging by his memoires Lie’s defense was twofold. First, he pointed out that what he 
consistently referred to as the privilege against self-incrimination (as opposed, probably, to a right against self-
incrimination27) was in clear violation of the Staff Rules, adopted by the UN General Assembly, and in particular 
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Article 1.4 thereof.28 Moreover, by joining the international civil service, the employees had waived whatever 
constitutional rights they may otherwise have enjoyed in the US.29 Second, he was clearly worried that the 
attitude of those eighteen individuals ‘imperiled the position of the Organization in the host country’30, and 
speaks of public opinion in the US not being favourable towards the UN ‘while the morale of the Secretariat 
slumped badly.’31 The former is a deontological argument, referring to rules and duties; the latter is a 
consequentialist argument. Lie’s memoires do not reveal exactly how the eighteen argued, but invoking the 
Fifth Amendment in itself suggests appealing to a right not to be coerced into anything, possibly backed up by 
the classic notions of freedom of conscience, of expression, of assembly. Whether the eighteen made any 
consequentialist argument is unknown, but one can easily imagine that they must have made reference to the 
consequences of an organization such as the UN giving in to political pressure from its host state.  
McCarthyism also reared its head, with more extensive argumentation available, within UNESCO, an 
international organization based in Paris. Several employees of UNESCO had been asked to fill out a 
questionnaire relating to communist sympathies and had been summoned to explain themselves before the US 
Embassy in Paris. Upon their refusal to do so, their contracts were terminated, despite having earlier received 
notice that appointments were to be continued. Four of them seized the Administrative Tribunal of the 
International Labour Organization (ILOAT), including Mr Peter Duberg, and the Tribunal found unequivocally in 
their favour, ordering the decisions not to extend any contracts to be rescinded.32 UNESCO was unhappy with 
the result and went to the International Court of Justice, a facility which at that time was still extant. The ICJ, 
however, found that ILOAT had in no way overstepped its competences, and that the validity of ILOAT’s 
decisions should be upheld.33 
The arguments invoked back and forth will seem familiar. UNESCO relied on the same article 1.4 of the Staff 
regulations that was relied on by Trygve Lie some time earlier, and the behavior of Duberg and others was 
considered ‘incompatible with the high standards of integrity’ required from UNESCO employees.34 Moreover 
(and here consequentialist thinking was introduced in addition to duty-based thought), the behavior of Duberg 
and others was ‘capable of harming the interests’ of UNESCO.35 
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Mr Duberg’s arguments however, as rendered by ILOAT, were clearly considered to be more forceful. The same 
article 1.4 of the Staff Rules was held to clearly recognize freedom of conscience with respect to both 
philosophical convictions and political opinions (the deontological argument)36; any other understanding, so 
ILOAT suggested, would wreak havoc: if other member states would start to do the same, it would be ‘liable to 
provoke disturbances in the international administration’ (the consequentialist argument).37 
ILOAT also invoked additional points, e.g., making clear that the Director-General of UNESCO was under a legal 
obligation not to receive instructions from any Government38, and that even if officials would have to abstain 
from propaganda or proselytism, this flowed from the ‘overriding interest of the international organization to 
which they owe their loyalty and devotion’39; in other words, the duty to abstain from political activism did not 
owe anything to national loyalties. Either way, the behaviour of Mr Duberg in no way suggested that he had 
placed his own interests above the ‘true interest’ of UNESCO, which consists ‘above all in safeguarding erga 
omnes its independence and impartiality’.40  
The structure of the argument is familiar. UNESCO invokes a legal rule (article 1.4 of the Staff Rules), combined 
with the interest of the organization. Mr Duberg suggests (and ILOAT agrees) that the legal rule is wrongly 
interpreted and that instead the relevant consideration is a different rule (freedom of conscience, less explicitly 
to be found in an applicable legal rule), in conjunction with a different conception of the interest of the 
organization. The organization’s interest is not best served by toeing the line of powerful member states, but 
instead by adhering strictly to independence and impartiality. On both sides, deontological and 
consequentialist arguments are used; no argument can be without.  
 
IV. The Organization and the Outside World: Cholera in Haiti and the UN 
 
Much the same logic also presents itself in relations between organizations and third parties, i.e. states, 
entities or others not directly related to the organization, including individuals. When international 
organizations were first created, in the late nineteenth century, the unspoked assumption was that their acts 
would only relate to their member states, and only to those states qua states. Organizations were not 
supposed to act autonomously in relation to other states, let alone other organizations, and their acts could, at 
best, only affect their member states in their capacity as member states: the populations of those member 
states would never be directly affected. 
It is doubtful whether this assumption was ever plausible, and it is clear that it has lost whatever degree of 
plausibility it may once have possessed: the acts of international organizations affect individuals in their 
member states, sometimes indirectly, sometimes also very directly. Surely, when the UN imposes individual 
sanctions, those individuals are affected. Surely, when the ILO sponsors labour conventions, individuals are 
affected. Surely, when the World Bank sponsors an infrastructure project, individuals are affected. And surely, 
when the UN sends peacekeeping troops to trouble spots, individuals are affected. And it is no good to claim, in 
                                                             
36 Ibid., sub chapter ’On the Substance’, consideration B. 
37 Ibid., sub chapter ’On the Substance’, consideration E. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., sub chapter ’On the Substance’, consideration B. 
40 Ibid., sub chapter ’On the Substance’, Consideration F. 
such cases, that those individuals have consented to be affected: this can be maintained with respect to 
member states (who join an organization of their own volition) and staff members (who opt to work for the 
organization), but not with respect to individuals who are subjected to an organization’s executive or 
operational activities.41 And this is relevant, as expressing consent has an ethical value in and of itself: if one 
consents to being treated in a particular manner, one can hardly complain about it, unless the manner of 
treatment differs from that what has been consented to.42 
So, what happened in Haiti? After the 2010 earthquake, the UN, which already had a presence on the island, 
sent in additional troops, including a contingent of peacekeepers from Nepal. Thereafter, cholera broke out in 
Haiti, for the first time in a century, and the suspicion arose that the cholera strains had been brought by 
Nepalese peacekeepers.43 It is not entirely clear whether these had been tested prior to deployment: the UN’s 
internal manuals provide for health checks in a three-month period before deployment, and there is no strong 
evidence that this has been circumvented. The health checks are the responsibility of the sending state, but 
need to be validated by the UN itself, and it seems that this is what has happened. Assuming this is accurate, 
the problem is not one of wanton neglect of prescribed procedures, but of a most unfortunate collision of 
circumstances: it is not at all impossible that prospective peacekeepers were duly checked, but contracted the 
disease in the period between being checked and being deployed.  
Either way, additional factors may well play a role, an important one being the decision to outsource waste 
management to a local Haitian company. In an attempt to do things without incurring huge costs (and placate 
the UN’s donors), the assignment went to the company which came up with the cheaper bid and thus received 
the tender to install waste management facilities near the camp. To little avail, it transpired: human faeces 
were seen floating in Haiti’s main river, the same river used for bathing and laundry purposes. 
The episode raises a host of ethical questions, some related to the health checks on peacekeepers and the 
attribution of responsibility when things go wrong; some others are related to the ethics of insisting on getting 
the private sector involved and securing cheap put possibly inadequate services. And yet other issues relate to 
the aftermath: while it is clear that something dreadful happened on the UN’s watch (regardless of whether 
blame can actually be attributed to the UN), the UN until December 2016 refused to issue an apology, and even 
then apologized for ‘not doing enough’ with respect to the outbreak of cholera and attempts to stop it, still 
stopping some way short of accepting any responsibility for the outbreak itself.44 Ironically – a rather sad irony 
– this may owe something to legal considerations, with the UN leadership fearing that an apology will be used 
against it in court. 
For the events have reached the US courts, with victims and relatives aiming to sue the UN for damages. So 
what are the arguments? Much of the legal argument before the Southern District Court in New York revolved 
around the questions of immunity: under the UN Charter and related instruments, the UN invokes immunity 
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whenever I am to enter a Helsinki University website to do my work (mark a thesis, e.g.), I am asked whether I consent to 
my personal details being made available to the same University – which, as my employer, already has that information at 
any rate… If I fail to consent, moreover, I am refused access to the thesis I am supposed to mark – so much for 
voluntarism. 
43 For a fine overview, see Jonathan M. Katz, The Big Truck that went By: How the World Came to Save Haiti and Left 
behind a Disaster (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013). 
44 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55694#.WldUSmeONVY (visited 11 January 2018). 
from suit, with some of the victims claiming that an exception ought to be made in cases involving third parties. 
Thus, it was argued that the UN’s indifference to the plight of Haitians ‘is inconsistent with international law, 
inconsistent with human rights obligations of the United Nations, inconsistent with the U.N.’s own 
understanding of its obligations, and inconsistent with the U.N.’s institutional practice’.45 Instead, what the UN 
should do, is to offer access to justice through setting up some form of arbitration mechanism and, so the 
argument continued, this is precisely what would be prescribed by section 29 of the 1946 General Convention 
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations in ‘disputes of a private law character’. 
The focus of the litigation thereby became the question whether the United Nations had been obligated to set 
up a special mechanism for settling any possible claims arising out of the cholera affair. Proponents argued in 
favour under reference to the wording of section 29 (a deontological argument) in conjunction with a hint to a 
more consequentialist argument. The grant of immunity in the 1946 General Convention had been based, so 
the proponents claimed, on a bargain: in exchange for immunity, the UN would set up alternative mechanisms 
for disputes of a private law character.46 Since the UN had not done so, it could not now invoke immunity – it 
had not kept its side of the bargain. And while the applicants did not develop the argument much further, they 
did not need to, as their message was clear: surely, the UN should not be allowed to get away with not keeping 
its side of the bargain. 
Defendants raised, as was to be expected, opposing arguments, claiming absolute immunity from suit for the 
UN, only to be lifted by an explicit waiver. This too relied on the text of the 1946 General Convention: section II 
lists the necessity of an explicit waiver in no uncertain terms. And as with the applicants’ argument, a more 
consequentialist argument needed merely to be hinted at: the UN’s immunity has always been premised on a 
functionalist logic, something to the effect that without immunity, it would be impossible for the UN to 
function properly.     
 
V. A Principle of Autonomy 
 
Now what do these three vignettes suggest with respect to autonomy? The argument is, in essence, 
straightforward, and comes in two steps. First, with the arguments being structured as suggested, the 
ontological existence of the organization is taken for granted. When the UN is sued over acting in Haiti, no one 
questions the existence of the UN. When the UN or UNESCO are sued by staff members, no one questions the 
existence of the UN, or its raison d’être. Joseph McCarthy, to put it starkly, wanted to free the UN from 
communist sympathizers, but his mission was not to close down the UN. He could have proposed various 
alternatives: he could have proposed that the UN be dissolved; he could have proposed that it would be 
                                                             
45 See Delama Georges and Others v United Nations and Others, transcript, October 23, 2014, at 37 (Muneer Ahmad, 
speaking on behalf of an amicus curiae group). Much of what follows is culled from the transcript and from the order of 
District Judge J. Paul Oetken, in Delama Georges and Others v United Nations and Others, 13-CV-1746 (JPO), dated 9 
January 2015 (both on file with the author). 
46 In actual fact there is very little (if any) evidence that such a bargain was made while the 1946 General Convention was 
concluded. The text of the Convention does not support such a reading, although it also does not provide an 
insurmountable obstacle. 
removed from US soil; he could have proposed that the UN withdraw from the organization – but he proposed 
neither of these alternative courses of action, not even with respect to UNESCO.47 
The second step of the argument is that in accepting a role as the addressee of a complaint, the organization 
strengthens its autonomy from the member states. Not only is its ontological existence secured, it is also the 
case that the organization maintains the screen (the institutional veil) between it and its member states.48 It 
may well be the case (though need not be) that organizations are controlled by some member states or act 
under instructions by some states, but by being positioned as separate actors, their autonomy from their 
member states is asserted and confirmed. 
This may seem like stating a truism, but there is an important point here: an international organization may be 
granted formal legal personality and therewith autonomy from its member states, but if such is never 
confirmed or even asserted it will become a ‘dead letter’. Put in more principled terms: organizations can exist 
in the eyes of the law if this is provided for in a legally relevant document, but it will need the occasional 
practical invocation in order to be sustained in the long run, in much the same way in which legally binding 
treaties can come to be terminated through the process of desuetude, or existing customary rules can be 
overruled by new practices. These may be slow processes, and relatively rare, but not entirely implausible.49  
Instead of being a truism, though, the point points to an inevitability (or, more accurately perhaps, a relative 
inevitability), and it goes something like this. International organizations are set up on a voluntary basis; under 
Enlightenment conditions, this is considered necessary so as to align their existence with the existence of 
sovereign states. Those states can as an emanation of their free will50 decide to pool their resources, but only if 
they consent thereto. Likewise, individuals are taken, for purposes of international civil service law, as 
sovereign entities, whose consent is required – anything else would amount to forced labour, bondage, or 
slavery. As a result, legal and ethical argument needs to take this seriously: member states, third parties, and 
international civil servants all can claim some moral autonomy and should not be confronted with acts that are 
forced on them. Thus, discussions on expulsion of member states, or dismissal of staff members, or even on 
legal protection of organizations themselves through privileges and immunities, need to respect this moral 
autonomy.51  
On these premises, there are only two types of argument available. One is an argument that the relevant party 
has broken a particular and applicable rule, or has otherwise not acted in accordance with a duty it had itself 
accepted. Legal obligations resting on international organizations cannot be picked from thin air, as a general 
proposition, but stem from conventions and headquarters agreements accepted by international organizations, 
from constitutional documents concluded between member states, and from employment contracts (or 
                                                             
47 The US would actually withdraw from UNESCO some thirty years later, amidst charges of mismanagement and 
corruption by UNESCO’s leadership. For brief discussion, see Yves Beigbeder, Management Problems in United Nations 
Organizations: Reform or Decline? (London: Frances Pinter, 1987). 
48 The leading conceptual study is Catherine Brölmann, The Institutional Veil in Public International Law: International 
Organisations and the Law of Treaties (Oxford: Hart, 2007).  
49 See e.g. E.W. Vierdag, Oorlogsverklaring (inaugural address, University of Amsterdam, 1992), discussing how treaties 
can fall into disuse if never applied even in circumstances where application is called for. 
50 See the Case of the SS Lotus, [1927] Publ. PCIJ, Series A, No. 10. 
51 Reportedly some voices within the UK, including the esteemed Lord Lugard, seriously considered to invite the US to 
undertake an intervention in Liberia. League members were bound by the Covenant but the US, so it was thought, as a 
non-member of the League could act freely without violating any contractual bond between it and Liberia. As reported in 
Von Gretschaninow, Der Versuch, at 175. 
administrative decisions52) consented to by international civil servants, all freely entered into. This, in turn, is 
premised on the idea that individuals, states and international organizations are all rational actors, pursuing 
their own interests with a certain vim and vigour. 
And yet, pursuing one’s own interests may entail that common interests are neglected; these fall by the 
wayside while everyone maximizes their own utility. As a result, somehow legal and ethical argument needs to 
use these resources as well, for surely otherwise the unmitigated pursuit of rational self-interest might affect 
the interests of others, if not now then quite possibly in the future. Even the patron saint of the regulatory 
function of the ‘invisible hand’, Adam Smith, realized all too well that the invisible hand could only do its magic 
work under specific conditions, something most competition authorities translate into doctrines about ‘abuse 
of a dominant position’ or similar devices. Hence, in addition to duty-based arguments, claims also tend to 
refer to the benign consequences of what is proposed, or the possibly devastating consequences if the ‘slippery 
slope’ is embarked on. It is not just the case that UNESCO’s Mr Duberg had a consent-based duty to act in 
particular manner, it is also the case that if he were allowed to act as he pleased, all hell would break loose. 
Liberia was said to have violated not only a consent-based obligation to treat native inhabitants justly, but if it 
would be allowed to get away with not doing so, the League would lapse into something undesirable. And the 
UN is not only entitled to immunity from suit due to the presence of consent-based legal rules, it is also a 
mechanism that allows the UN to work effectively and without disturbance. Rule-based or duty-based 
arguments rarely stand alone; they are usually accompanied by warnings about the consequences. 
The net result is that as a consequence of this interplay between deontology and consequentialism, itself 
necessitated by the (usually implicit) assumption about the moral autonomy of all relevant actors, the only 
possible thing that can happen is that legal and ethical disputes, for all their interminability, end up confirming 
the autonomy of the organization. Within the parameters of debates on the premise of the moral autonomy of 
all relevant actors, there is no escape: assuming moral autonomy results in confirming moral autonomy, 
including that of international organizations, and any conclusion to a moral or legal dispute remains vulnerable 
to criticism. The decision to uphold the UN’s immunity will not satisfy those who advocated that immunity be 
lifted, as their arguments are not seriously met, only mirrored. The decision not to expel Liberia (a decision 
never formally taken) does little to satisfy the arguments of those who advocated expulsion; and the decision 
to invalidate the dismissals of Mr Duberg and his colleagues does little to appease the UNESCO bosses and their 
fears of creeping communism. By staying within the same register, the arguments are bound to be each other’s 
reflection, and disagreements literally interminable. The only reason to consider the disagreement as 
terminated is not because one claim is stronger than the other on its merits, but because an authoritative 
person or organ (typically a court or tribunal) makes a decision. In such a setting, there are only two possible 
escape routes. 
The first of these is to give up all pretenses relating to the moral autonomy of actors. If states or international 
organizations do not have to be assumed to be morally autonomous, no harm will be done if things are 
imposed upon them, and if so, no harm will be done if legal rules are broken in the process – if there would be 
legal rules to begin with in such a setting (as opposed to coercion, to ‘might being right’). Some of the 
                                                             
52 Amerasinghe notes that some organizations use contracts, while others use administrative decisions to regulate labour 
relations. In both cases though what is relevant is the consent of the civil servant. See C.F. Amerasinghe, The Law of the 
International Civil Service, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press, 1994). 
traditional ‘so-called ‘realist’ literature on international relations contains traces hereof53, doubting the moral 
autonomy of international organizations while upholding that of states, but this was never credible54 and has 
come to be questioned even by its own practitioners.55 
The second escape route is different in nature, and premised on a dual notion. First, moral autonomy is not 
disregarded, but focused on the individual. After all, states and international organizations alike are not merely 
impersonal bureaucratic structures, but are composed of individuals and, more importantly perhaps, managed 
by individuals. The UN may well be the UN, but its character at any given moment in time is partly determined 
by the identity of the Secretary-General and other high-ranking officials. It is not for nothing that many tend to 
think that the UN under Hammarskjöld was a different creature from the UN under Waldheim, say, or Boutros-
Ghali. It is arguable that the influence of individuals is limited, hemmed in by structures and rules and 
constituencies, and partly determined by the situations in which these individuals find themselves. 
Hammarskjöld, it might be suggested, could leave a legacy because he found himself running an organization 
paralyzed by the Cold War. The point is, though, that he managed to exploit the power vacuum between the 
two opposing superpowers in ways that others have proved unable to do, and it is here, in the margins of 
management, that personality comes to matter. 
Second, then, legal and ethical argument can shift to (or be complemented by) an appeal to what can be 
expected from individuals in the professional roles they occupy. Often this is not so much a matter of whether 
rules are being violated – and this is not even always easy to identify. Rules can be manipulated; rules can leave 
discretion; rules can be in conflict with one another; rules can even, on occasion, be completely absent. In such 
cases, it may matter how persons in a position of leadership come to act, and especially on what basis they 
come to act. Launching a military intervention to test new weapons systems at the expense of thousands of 
lives is not a good idea; launching the same intervention, at the same expense, for the purpose of saving many 
other lives might just about be justifiable. Deontology and consequentialism have little room for the proper 
motivation of ethical behavior56, but a focus on motivation and the propriety thereof can be derived from 
Aristotelian virtue ethics. 
This is not the place to further develop a virtue ethics framework; suffice it to say that the legal literature, 
including the international law literature, contains some hints to this effect, some more explicit57 than others58, 
                                                             
53 And has sadly found some echo in relatively recent writings by international lawyers, conjuring up a world exclusively 
populated by states where international organizations do not exist or, when they do, play no role whatsoever: see Jack 
Goldsmith and Eric Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2005). 
54 At least not since the emergence of international organizations in the latter third of the nineteenth century has it been 
plausible to regard organizations as epiphenomenal, which is not to deny that organizations can be vehicles for particular 
interests. A fine study is Craig Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance Since 1850 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1994). 
55 See e.g. Tana Johnson, Organizational Progeny (Oxford University Press, 2014), proudly proclaiming to be initiating a 
paradigm shift in the field of international relations by providing international organizations with a role (and moral 
autonomy) of their own.   
56 This was one of the pivotal points inspiring Anscombe’s classic critique: see Elizabeth Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral 
Philosophy’, reproduced in Roger Crisp and Michael Slote (eds.), Virtue Ethics (Oxford University Press, 1997), 26-44.  
57 Colin Farrell and Lawrence Solum (eds.), Virtue Jurisprudence (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008); Amalia Amaya and 
Ho Hock Lai (eds.), Law, Virtue and Justice (Oxford: Hart, 2013); Jan Klabbers, ‘The Virtues of Expertise’, in Monika Ambrus 
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Irrelevant Actors? (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 82-101. 
58 Koskenniemi’s appeal to a ‘culture of formalism’ can be understood as a virtue-based approach. It is developed in Martti 
Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise of Modern International Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge University 
and these have in common that their initial focus rests not so much on acts (maligned or otherwise), but on the 
actors performing them in their professional roles: as government lawyers or judges, as directors-general, as 
policy experts, as mediators.  
This has several advantages from an evaluative perspective. First, by acknowledging that decision-making is in 
part a function of the individuals making the decisions, it allows for moral dilemmas to be taken seriously. Such 
dilemmas are plentiful, for instance due to the circumstance that rules may be conflicting, and different 
constituencies may have different yet equally legitimate concerns as far as consequences are concerned. The 
perennial discussion about the World Bank and human rights may constitute an example: deontological 
lawyers (almost a pleonasm59) insist that the World Bank should not engage in the violation of human rights60; 
their economist colleagues, trained consequentialists, fundamentally do not grasp the point if it can be 
demonstrated that certain policies may be overall beneficial.61   
Second, it allows for the termination of ethical debate. If the above is correct in that deontological and 
consequentialist argument feeds off each other and engage each other in a continuous loop, a focus on 
character and virtue may help debate reach a conclusion: should, for instance, the World Bank decide 
arrogantly to embark on a particular project because of the prestige involved in it, then surely it is doing 
something wrong, regardless of whether in doing so it violates any rules or whether the activity leads to 
nefarious consequences. Doing something solely for reasons of prestige is by no means rare, but it is not 
particularly virtuous. In MacIntyrean terms, doing so focuses on the goods external to a practice, whereas one 
should ideally be motivated by the pursuit of goods internal to a practice. It would be like playing chess in order 
to become rich, rather than out of an appreciation of the challenges of the game; it would be like becoming a 
film producer in order to force girls (or boys) into sex, rather than out of appreciation for the art.62  
And third, a partial shift to the virtues may help to evaluate the absence of behaviour. International 
organizations are established with a certain function in mind, but often enough, they do not act when an 
appeal on their function would make us expect action – the UN inaction in Rwanda in 1994 is perhaps the most 
painful example.63 In the absence of strong rules ordering organizations to act, the only yardstick left is to 
analyze the inaction and the motivations behind it in light of the organization’s mandate.64 
 
VI. Final Remarks 
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This article has suggested that the autonomy of international organizations need not be invoked as principle of 
international organizations law in order to materialize. Instead, legal and ethical debate invoking duties and 
consequences will inevitably see to it that the autonomy of the organization is confirmed and strengthened, for 
the same reason that acts of non-recognition are philosophically paradoxical: an explicit non-recognition tends 
to do precisely what it explicitly negates.65 As long as legal and ethical debate oscillates between duties and 
consequences, there is no terminus: a deontological debate can always be met with a consequentialist critique, 
and vice versa. Hence, one either has to ignore the moral autonomy (the extra-contractual freedom) of actors 
altogether, or change register, for instance by resorting to the virtues, in order for ethical and legal debate to 
be conclusive. 
The one remaining question then is what a move to the virtues entails with respect to the autonomy of 
international organizations, and it would seem the answer is rather similar. A reference to the UN under 
Hammarskjöld is still a reference to the UN, even if behaviour is attributed to Hammarskjöld. This follows from 
his professional role: he is not acting in his private capacity, but representing the UN – and it can be anticipated 
that in that capacity his acts do not always coincide with the acts of private citizen Hammarskjöld. The 
philosophy of action has established that when people change roles, they do not change their identities and 
characters66, but different roles entail different responsibilities, different constituencies, different activities. It 
is plausible that Dag Hammarskjöld the Swedish civil servant would have taken different decisions in that 
capacity than he would have done as UN Secretary-General, even on the same issues, simply because his 
different professional role would have prompted different attitudes.  
The virtue perspective does, however, allow for a nuance: since the UN under Hammarskjöld may differ from 
the UN under, say, Waldheim, it is acceptable in debates to point to these differences, in much the same way 
that individuals can point to their own development: from young people other things are expected than from 
older people; youthful indiscretions may be forgiven, whereas the same behavior in older people invites 
condemnation. That is not to say that the maturity metaphor should be taken seriously: the life of an 
international organization does not progress in the same way as that of an individual, and should not be 
expected to do so. The suggestion here is merely that under different leadership, the same legal entity will 
display different types of behaviour, and some leaders will strive to be more autonomous vis-à-vis member 
states than others.67      
Be that as it may, it seems reasonably clear that the autonomy of international organizations vis-à-vis their 
member states benefits from engaging in debate on the legality or ethical propriety of what the organization 
does or even what it represents, analogous to the classic Public Relations slogan that ‘there is no such thing as 
bad publicity’. It would seem that there is some merit in adopting a virtue perspective in addition to more 
traditional perspectives, but doing so is unlikely to affect the autonomy of the institution in any measurable 
way.  
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